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Foote: Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena

VON SAHER V. NORTON SIMON MUSEUM OF
ART AT PASADENA

754 F.3D 712 (9TH CIR. 2014)
1. INTRODUCTION

This case dealt with the long history of two panels of Adam and
Eve painted in the sixteenth century by Lucas Cranach the Elder.'
Today, the panels hang in the Norton Simon Museum of Art, although their contested history has brought them to Ukraine, Germany, and the Netherlands. 2 Marei Von Saher claimed to be the
rightful owner of the panels, which she alleged were taken illegally
from her husband's family by the Nazis during World War II.3
She filed suit against the Museum in 2007 under California Code
of Civil Procedure §354.3, and again in 2011 under §338(C). 4 The
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the
2011 action with prejudice, holding that Von Saher's claim was

1. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712
(9th Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 714.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 718. Section 354.3 became effective in 2003 and provided that any
owner, heir, or beneficiary of a Holocaust-era artwork could bring an action to
recover Holocaust-era art from any museum or gallery, and that any action
brought under this section would not be dismissed for failure to comply with the
statute of limitations if commenced before December 31, 2010. Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-2866-JFW, 2007 WL
4302726, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct 18, 2007). In the first Von Sahercase, the district
court found this statute facially unconstitutional, basing its decision on an earlier
Ninth Circuit ruling that had held a similar California statute that created a cause
of action for claims involving Second World War slave labor unconstitutional.
Id. (citing Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003)). The district
court stated that it was "not only compelled to apply the foreign affairs doctrine,
it is bound by the interpretation of that doctrine as set forth in the Ninth Circuit
in Deutsch." Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit then upheld the ruling that this section
was unconstitutional, but allowed Von Saher to amend her complaint to be in
compliance with § 338(c), which gave three years for a plaintiff to bring a claim
for specific recovery of personal property. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 968-70 (9th Cir. 2009).
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barred by conflict preemption. 5 It stated that the relief she sought
directly conflicted with the United States' policy of external restitution and respect for the finality of Dutch restitution proceedings
after World War 11.6
Von Saher appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed and
remanded to the district court. 7 The Ninth Circuit held that Von
Saher's claims did not conflict with foreign policy, and that serious
weight did not need to be given to the Solicitor General's opinion
in his amicus curiae brief regarding United States' policy towards
restitution.8 The court reversed and remanded to determine whether the transfer of the panels from the Netherlands to a third party
was a sovereign act, and if so, whether an exception to the act of
state doctrine would apply.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. FactualHistory
The two panels at issue, Adam and Eve, were painted in 1530 by
Cranach the Elder, and hung in the Church of the Holy Trinity in
Kiev for nearly 400 years. 10 In 1927, Soviet authorities seized the
panels, first sending them to the Art Museum at the Ukrainian
Academy of Science in Kiev, and then arranging for their sale at
an auction in Berlin in 1931, along with other works in a collection
Jacques Goudstikker, a
called "The Stroganoff Collection.""
prominent Dutch-Jewish art dealer, purchased the panels and
brought them to the Netherlands. 12 In 1940, the Nazis invaded the
Netherlands and the Goudstikkers fled, leaving their gallery behind. 3 Jacques's mother had stayed behind, and was forced to sell
the gallery's assets at a fraction of their value to Nazi Reichsmar5. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 719.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 714.
8. Id. at 724-25.
9. Id. at 726-277.
10. Id. at 715.
11. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 715.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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schall Herman Goring, who took the panels to Berlin.14 When
American forces arrived in Germany in 1944-45, they identified
the panels in a cache of Nazi-looted art in Munich.' Per President
Truman's policy of working with European nations to effectuate
external and internal restitution after the war, the Allied Forces returned the panels to the Dutch government in 1946.16
That year, Desi Goudstikker, Jacques's wife, returned to the
Netherlands, seeking restitution of the Goudstikker family collection under the Dutch Restitution of Legal Rights Decree.' 7The
Dutch government determined it had no obligation to restore the
looted property, as it characterized the forced sales of 1940 as vol14. Id.

15. Id. at 716.
16. Id. at 716. United States policy regarding restitution of Nazi looted assets was developed with an eye towards planning for the rebuilding of Europe
after World War II. The Presidential Advisory Commission On Holocaust Assets in the United States, Report Draft: U.S. Restitution Policy RegardingAssets
Seized From Nazi Victims During World War II at 1-2, (February 29, 2000),
http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%20available
at
%20Digital%20Library/holocaust/theft/Box%20177/6997222-restitutionpolicy.pdf. The policy emphasized restitution not to individuals, but to governments, in part because of the massive scale of looting that made restitution a
daunting task. Id. at 3. In 1943, the Allies adopted the London Declaration,
which declared invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property, its rights and
its interests, which were situated in Axis territories, and which belonged to persons resident in those territories. Inter-Allied DeclarationAgainst Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, Jan.
available at
5, 1943, 8 Department of State Bulletin 21 (1943)
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/inter-allied-declaration. In 1945, Military
Government Law 52 came into effect, authorizing the Allied armies to take possession and management over property that had been the subject of duress and
dispossession. Military Government Gazette, United States Zone, Issue A, 1
June 1946, published by the Office of Military Government for Germany (US),
24-27. This helped to establish the policy of external restitution, or the return of
assets found in Germany to the countries from which they had been taken, and
internal restitution, or the return of assets looted within Germany. The Presidential Advisory Commission, Report Draft. After the war, it was presumed by
the Allied governments that private property that had been looted from Nazioccupied countries would be restituted to the victims. id. As was shown in this
case, as well as several others, the internal restitution policies of formerly occupied countries have had differing success rates.
17. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 716.
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untary transactions.18 Not until 1952 did Desi enter into a settlement agreement with the Dutch government, under which she repurchased some of the assets taken from her family.' 9 The panels,
however, were not returned, and remained with the Dutch government in the Dutch National Collection. 20
In 1961, George Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, heir to the aforementioned Stroganoff Collection, filed a claim with the Dutch government for the panels, claiming that the Soviet government had
wrongfully seized them from his family and sold them in the 1931
auction in Berlin.21 The Dutch government sold the panels to
Stroganoff in 1966, without notifying either Desi, or her son Edo.22
Stroganoff sold the panels in 1971 to an art dealer, who then transferred them to the Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena, California.23
Meanwhile, the legal rights to the Goudstikker family assets
were passed from Desi, to Edo, and then to Edo's wife, Marei Von
Saher, the sole living heir of Jacques Goudstikker. 24 In 1997, after
the Dutch government undertook a new investigation into the
provenance of World War II works in its possession, Von Saher
was contacted by a Dutch journalist who informed her about the
looting of the Goudstikker gallery.25 In 1998, she sought the surrender of the Goudstikker collection held by the Netherlands, and
the Dutch State Secretary rejected her request based on the applicable statute of limitations. 26 Not until 2004, when Von Saher
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 717.
21. Id. at 718. Count Alexander Sergevitch Stroganoff was the original owner of a prominent Russian collection in the early 2 0 th century. StroganoffScherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Soviet Gov-

ernment appropriated several works of art from the collection under a series of
decrees in the 1920s, which nationalized movable property inside Russia that

was held in State Museums or that had been held by citizens who had fled Russia after the communist uprising. Id. at 21. Several works made their way to the
1931 Lepke Kunst Auctions Hause in Berlin. Id. at 20.
22. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 718.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
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again made a restitution claim for the collection, did the Dutch
State Secretary agree to return the Goudstikker works held by the
Netherlands. 27 The panels, however, were by then in the possession of the Norton Simon Museum, and their existence and location were unknown to Von Saher.28 After discovering the location
of the works through a Ukrainian art historian in 2000, Von Saher
contacted the museum, and the two parties unsuccessfully attempted to reach a settlement for ownership of the works.29
B. ProceduralHistory
In 2007, Von Saher sued the Museum, relying on California
Code of Civil Procedure §354.3.30 The District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the suit, finding §354.3 facially unconstitutional. 3 1 In 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's opinion, and remanded to allow Von Saher to amend
her complaint in line with California Code of Civil Procedure
§338(c), the general three-year statute of limitations for the recovery of stolen property. 32 Six weeks after the Ninth Circuit opinion,
the California legislature amended §338(c), extending the statute
of limitations for filing a recovery of fine art claim against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer from three to six years.3 3 In
addition, the legislature adopted an 'actual discovery' rule for the
identity and location of the art, and made this applicable to all
claims filed or pending before 2017, as long as the art had been
taken in the 100 years prior.34 Von Saher filed an amended complaint under this new version of §338(c). 35 The District Court

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.at 718.
Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 718.
Id.
Id.

31. Id.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 718-19.
34. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 719. See also

CAL.

CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)

(West 2011).
35. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 719.
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again dismissed her complaint, holding that it was preempted by
the foreign affairs doctrine, and Von Saher appealed.36
III. DISCUSSION
The Ninth Circuit first addressed foreign affairs preemption, the
grounds on which the District Court below had dismissed the
case. 37 It noted the underlying proposition that "[t]he Constitution
allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal government
exclusively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the
authority to resolve war claims, is central to the foreign affair
power in the constitutional design." 38 Although the first Von Saher
case had been dismissed based on field preemption, this case
hinged on conflict preemption, namely, whether "the remedies she
seeks, are in conflict with federal policy on the restitution of Nazistolen art."39 Although recognizing that "[t]here is, of course, no
question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches
on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's policy," 40 the court concluded that Von Saher's claims were not of this
nature.

41

Second, the court looked to federal policy on the restitution of
Nazi-looted art, including the London Declaration and the United
States' World War II policy of external restitution, the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art, and the
2009 Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues.4 2 The court also cited a 2011 brief from the Solicitor Gen-

36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 713-14 (9th Cir.

2003)).
39. Id.
40. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 719-20 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003)).

41. Id. at 720.
42. Id. at 720-21. In the London Declaration, the United States adopted a
policy of external restitution towards Holocaust-era looted art. Id. at 720. The
Washington Conference Principles, signed by 44 governments, including the
United States and the Netherlands, pledged to resolve issues surrounding Nazilooted art. Id. at 721. Lastly, the Terezin Declaration, also signed by the United
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eral, which explained that the United States' policy of external restitution did not end in 1948 and that it has a "continuing interest in
that finality when appropriate actions have been taken by a foreign
government concerning the internal restitution of art." 43 In summary, the court stated, the United States policy included (1) a
commitment to the internal restitution efforts of foreign governments, (2) a pledge to identify and publicize Nazi-looted art, (3) an
encouragement to pre-war owners to come forward with claims,
(4) "concerted efforts to achieve expeditious, just and fair outcomes," (5) an encouragement for everyone to follow the Washington Principles, and (6) "a recommendation that every effort be
made to remedy the consequences of forced sales." 44
Third, the Ninth Circuit held that Von Saher's claims did not
conflict with any federal restitution policy "because the Cranachs
were never subject to postwar internal restitution proceedings in
the Netherlands . . . ."4 Noting that Desi's restitution attempts
were "met with hostility by the postwar Dutch Government," the
States and the Netherlands, reaffirmed the Washington Principles and encouraged both public and private institutions to follow them as well. Id.
43. Id. at 720. This brief was filed with the Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Court following the first Ninth Circuit decision, and urged the Supreme Court to
deny certiorari. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 09-1254 (U.S.), 2011 WL
2134984 (May 27, 2011). The Solicitor General stated that "[t]he court of appeals correctly held that the invocation in this case of California Code of Civil
Procedure § 354.3 . . .impermissibly intrudes upon the foreign affairs authorities of the federal government." Id. at *9. The brief noted that "[t]he federal
government has traditionally exercised its foreign relations and war powers with
respect to the resolution of private parties' claims arising out of international
disputes" and that it was specifically the President and Congress that have the
sole authority to resolve U.S. nationals' claims arising out of international incidents. Id. at * 12-13. Furthermore, it stated that "this case concerns artworks and
transactions that, consistent with U.S. policies, have already been the subject of
both external and internal restitution proceedings, including recent proceedings
by the Netherlands in response to the Washington Principles." Id. at *16. The
United States, it continued, did not end its external restitution policy in 1948
with the deadline for filing restitution claims from World War II, but instead has
a continuing interest in the finality of the actions of foreign governments concerning internal restitution. Id. at * 17.
44. Von Saher, 754 F.3dat 721.
45. Id.
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court reasoned that "Desi decided that she could not achieve a successful result in a sham restitution proceeding to recover the artworks Goring had looted." 46 In response to the Museum's argument that the panels' conveyance to Stroganoff established his
status as the rightful heir, the court stated that because this claim
was based on events predating wartime seizure of property, "it
seems dubious at best to cast Stroganoff's claim as one of internal
restitution." 4 7 The court stated that "the diptych was never subject
to a post-war internal restitution proceeding in the Netherlands,"
because the Dutch government did not surrender the Goudstikker
artworks until 1998, at which point the panels were no longer under Dutch control, and because of the Dutch government's
acknowledgement of its "cold and often even callous" initial postwar restitution.48 The court noted the differences between this case
and American Insurance Association v. Garamendi were that:
(1)"[h]ere, however, there is no Holocaust-specific legislation at
issue," (2) that Von Saher sought relief from a Museum divorced
from the wartime events, and (3) that the Dutch government was

9
not involved in the suit4

The court addressed the Solicitor General's brief, stating that
although "'there is a strong argument that federal courts should
give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of [a] case's
impact on foreign policy'

. . .

there are many reasons why we find

that weight unwarranted here." 5° First, the brief focused on California Code of Civil Procedure §354.3, which "is an altogether different issue from the one we now decide," namely Von Saher's
specific claims against the Museum. 51 Second, the brief "charac-

46. Id. at 722.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 722-23.
49. Id. at 723-24. Garamendiinvolved California legislation that deemed the
confiscation or frustration of World War II insurance policies for Jewish policy
holders as an unfair business practice. 539 U.S. 396, 408-11 (2003). In a suit
against European insurance companies, the Supreme Court held that the Holocaust-era legislation was preempted due to the "clear conflict" between the policies adopted by the federal government and California. Id. at 420.
50. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 724 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 733 n. 21 (2004)).

51. Id.
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terizes the facts in a way that conflicts with the complaint, the record before us and the parties' positions," especially in its assertion
that the works had already been subject to full Dutch restitution
proceedings. 52 The court therefore found that the brief went beyond addressing foreign policy and inappropriately strayed into
53
making (erroneous) factual determinations.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "[w]e are mindful that
the litigation of this case may implicate the act of state doctrine,"
the proposition that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect
that independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another, done within its own territory." 54 The Dutch government's conveyance of the panels to Stroganoff may constitute an
official act of a sovereign, and therefore trigger the application of
the act of state doctrine, an issue that was not developed in the
District Court below. 51 The court concluded that on remand, the
District Court should address whether the conveyance to Stroganoff was in satisfaction of an official restitution claim, whether it
met public or private interests, and whether an exception to the
56
doctrine applied.

IV. DISSENT
Von Saher also contained a lengthy dissent from Judge Wardlaw, who stated, "I would conclude that federal foreign policy
preempts Von Saher's state law claims." 57 He determined that the
United States had persuasively stated that its involvement with the
panels ended when it returned them to the Netherlands in 1945,
and the Goudstikkers had adequate opportunity to reclaim the
works under Dutch restitution proceedings.58 He argued the im52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 725 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
55. Id. at 726.
56. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 726. The court specifically noted the commercial
exception, which has yet to be adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the application of
the Hickenlooper Amendment, and violations of international law. Id. at 727.
57. Idat 732.
58. Id. at 728-29.
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portance of finality in external restitution proceedings and that
more weight should be given to the expressed opinion of the executive branch that "World War II property claims may not be litigated in U.S. courts if the property was 'subject' or 'potentially
subject' to adequate internal restitution process in its country of
origin." 59 In addition, Judge Wardlaw stated that "[i]n my view,
Von Saher's attempt to recover the Cranachs in U.S. courts directly thwarts the central objective of U.S. foreign policy in this area:
to avoid entanglement in ownership disputes over externally restituted property .... "60 Not only had Desi Goudstikker failed to file
a claim in the Netherlands before the 1951 deadline, he argued, but
the United States had determined as a matter of foreign policy that
the Dutch restitution process was bona fide, and "we may not displace the Executive's assessment that the Netherlands' postwar
proceedings were adequate." 6' Lastly, on his own evaluation of
the facts, Judge Wardlaw found that the Dutch restitution proceedings in 1998-99 and 2004-06 were bona fide, and that just because
Von Saher did not receive her requested relief did not prove oth62
erwise.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Von Saher case is part of a long line of Holocaust-art restitution cases in which courts seem constrained by multiple judicial
and constitutional doctrines.63 However, the case did add several
new elements and has "major implications for future restitution
claims." 64 In total, it seems to indicate that some U.S. courts, if

59. Id. at 728 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 729.
61. Id. at 729-30.
62. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 731-32.
63. See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009), Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No. 10
Civ. 9126 (SAS), 2011 WL 4430856, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011), aff'd 702 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2012), Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).

64. Nicholas O'Donnell, Restitution Claims for Cranach Paintings in the
Norton Simon Museum Revived by Ninth Circuit, Case Now Hinges on Act of
2014),
(June
9,
REPORT
LAW
ART
State
Doctrine,
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only in the Ninth Circuit, are beginning to take a more contextual
and nuanced view towards art restitution cases, and are questioning the impact they may have on U.S. foreign relations.
Notably, the court cited the Washington Principles and Terezin
Declaration as examples of federal policy towards restituted art, a
position that gives these international declarations more legal influence. 65 As the court stated in its opinion, "Von Saher is just the
sort of heir that the Washington Principles and Terezin Declaration
encouraged to come forward to make claims ...."66 Although the
two declarations were signed by a host of international authorities
and can be seen as "an international obligation to provide claimants a means to seek restitution," they are technically nonbinding.67 If the Ninth Circuit's position towards these two conventions is expanded, there are several other treaties that may bolster the claims of plaintiffs in Holocaust-era looted art cases. These
include both the 1899 Hague Convention and the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land,
examined in another art case, Menzel v. List.68 The application of
these international agreements could also implicate the "treaty exception" to the Act of State Doctrine, which the court did not mention and is not yet well developed. It has been recognized in other
circuits: "the Act of State Doctrine does not preclude judicial review where, as here, there is a relevant, unambiguous treaty setting

http://www.artlawreport.com/2014/06/09/von-saher-claims-to-adam-and-eve-inthe-norton-simon-museum-revived-by-ninth-circuit-case-now-hinges-on-act-ofstate-doctrine/.

65. Id.
66. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 723.
67. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, State Law Holocaust-EraArt Claims and FederalExecutive Power, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 315, 322(2011).
68. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). For example, the 1907 Hague Convention, article 56 provided that property of municipalities, charities, and arts and sciences institutions was to be treated as private
property during wartime. Id. Further, seizure of this property was forbidden,
and would be subject to adjudication in court. Id. Germany, the Netherlands

and the United States were among the parties to this convention. Id. at 816. See
International Committee of the Red Cross, "Treaties and States Parties to Such
Treaties: Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex http://www.icrc.org/ihl/fNTO/195.
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forth principles of international law applicable to the situation at
hand."69
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the act of state doctrine is limited mostly to the commercial exception and the Hickenlooper
Amendment, although this is perhaps the most significant portion
of the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Although the doctrine is relatively
longstanding in Federal jurisprudence, its basis and policy implications have not been fully developed by courts, and it is applied dif70
ferently throughout the Circuit Courts and in the Supreme Court.
It has been discussed in various art repatriation cases, with mixed
results for plaintiffs.7'
As the court notes, the "commercial exception" to the act of
state doctrine exists in situations where "foreign governments do
not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns," but "those powers that
can be exercised by private citizens."72 Since the seminal case establishing this exception, Alfred Dunhill, lower courts have been
split as to its application73 While the Second Circuit has nearly
endorsed it, the Eleventh Circuit has flatly rejected it. 74 As Russ
Schlossbach states in his article, "the commercial activity exception, itself, is essentially the result of a debate over the scope of the
term, 'public act,' within the meaning of the Act of State Doctrine." 75 In Von Saher, the characterization of the conveyance to

Stroganoff as a private, rather than public, act could negate the application of act of state. It is unclear upon what factors this charac-

69. American Intern. Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp.
522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980).
70. Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L.

REV. 325, 327 (1986).
71. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russ. Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); Konowaloff, 2011 WL 4430856; Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, 420 F.
Supp. 18; Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804.
72. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Rep. of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704
(1976).
73. Russ Schlossbach, Arguably Commercial, Ergo Adjudicable?: The Validity of a Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 18 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 139, 152 (2000).
74. Id. at 152-53.
75. Id. at 156.
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terization will turn should the District Court, on remand, decide to
address the commercial activity exception.
The Hickenlooper Amendment, which the court cites as another
exception to act of state, may also apply in this case.7 6 The Hickenlooper Amendment was passed in 1964, and bars the use of the
act of state doctrine for expropriations of property that occurred
after January 1, 1959. 77 While this would seem to bar application
of the act of state defense for the conveyance to Stroganoff in
1966, the amendment provides an exception where the President
requests application of act of state due to "foreign policy interests
of the United States" and files a letter to that effect with the
court. 78 Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Solicitor General's brief, it is possible that a brief filed directly from the President, with a clear understanding of the facts and a clear policy
statement, might have changed the outcome.
Also notable in this case is the court's recognition of the context
of postwar Europe, and particularly of the situation in which Desi
Goudstikker found herself. As Nicholas O'Donnell states, "[m]ost
World War 11 art restitution cases have foundered against neutral
rules that often ignored the particular context of postwar Europe.
This opens up some possibility for a more expansive view." 79 It
bears noting that the Von Saher opinion closely resembles another
recent (December 2013) Ninth Circuit case, Cassirer v. ThyssenBornemisza Collection Foundation,in which plaintiffs brought an
action to recover a painting taken from their ancestors by the Nazis, which hung in a Spanish museum.8 0 Like Von Saher, the heirs
filed under California Code of Civil Procedure, § 338(c)(3).1 The
Ninth Circuit, holding that §338(c)(3) was constitutional, as in the
first Von Saher case, stated that "the Foundation failed to demonstrate that §338(c)(3) burdens its right to free speech ... [t]he Legislature could rationally choose to extend the statute of limitations
76. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 727.

77. Patty Gerstenblith, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 577 (3d ed.
2012).
78. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012).
79. O'Donnell, supra note 64.
80. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613, 615
(9th Cir. 2013).
81. Id.
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period to six years for actions against certain entities that it
deemed 'sophisticated.' ' 82 Cassirer and Von Saher represent a
definite trend in the Ninth Circuit towards the desire to adjudicate
on the merits, rather than to dismiss on technicalities, these types
of restitution claims.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Von Saher case represents an important step forward for the
plaintiffs seeking to file Holocaust-era art restitution claims. While
the court did not decide which party had legal rights to the panels,
it did positively establish that not only were Von Saher's claims
not in conflict with federal policy, "but we believe her claims are
in concert with that policy."83 The court looked to foreign policy

declarations, such as the 1998 Washington Principles and the 2009
Terezin Declaration, which had, until this time, not received such
affirmative legal endorsement.84 The Ninth Circuit also paved the
way for a more nuanced and contextual judicial understanding of
the post-World War II repatriation process, which will serve future
litigants well in attempting to unravel the tangled factual, legal,
and moral web of Holocaust-era art claims. Considering the number of times Von Saher and its iterations have been back and forth
between courts, it seems likely that no matter what the District
Court decides in relation to the act of state doctrine, the Ninth Circuit will see this case a third time. Perhaps then it can come to a
definitive judicial pronouncement on the act of state doctrine and,
hopefully, reach the merits of the case.
The Norton Simon Museum has stated that it will seek review of
the Ninth Circuit decision by an expanded panel, and issued a
statement saying it "remains confident that it holds complete and
proper title to Adam and Eve."1 5 This may be unsurprising, given

82.
83.
84.
85.
Simon

Id. at 621.
Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 723.
Id. at 721.
Mike Boehm, Court seems to boost claim to 'Adam' and 'Eve' at Norton
Museum,
LA
TIMES
(July
4,
2014),

http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-norton-simon-cranachadam-eve-20140704-story.html#page=l.
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the panels' value at $24 million, according to a 2006 appraisal.86
Because many Holocaust-era looted works, such as Adam and Eve,
may be worth millions, it also seems unsurprising that many of
these contests end up in court. However, expensive legal battlesare
not always, nor should they be, the best result.
Von Saheralso contested the ownership of another painting,
Vanitas by JacuqesAdolphz de Claeuw, which had been bought in
the 1960s by the Cunmer Museum of Art and Gardens in Florida. 87 Von Saher and the Cummer Museum successfully worked
out a settlement agreement, under which the museum paid Von
Saher an undisclosed sum and returned the painting, only to accept
it back from her as a donation in memory of Jacques Goudstikker.88 Von Saher stated that "[i]t is heartening to see museums
like The Cummer do the right thing for Holocaust victims and their
heirs. I am grateful to The Cummer for returning this painting to
Jacques Goudstikker's family. We hope that the restitution of this
work will lead other museums to act just as responsibly when
faced with the discovery of Nazi-looted art in their collections."89
NatalieFoote*

86. Id.
87. Mike Boehm, Woman Suing Norton Simon for Nazi-looted Art has Florida
Success,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
27,
2014),
http ://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-norton-simon-nazilooted-art-adam-eve-vanitas-20140626-story.html.
88. Id.
89. Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, Marei von Saher Announces Resolution of
Claim against the Cummer Museum of Art & Gardens RegardingNazi-Looted
Painting,
BusINESS
WIRE
(June
25
2014),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140625005812/en/Marei-vonSaher-Announces-Resolution-Claim-Cummer#.U8wyOdw8Qds.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2010, Macalester College. Thank you to Professor Patty Gerstenblith for reviewing this article.
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